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Abstract
Since the passage of the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1952, private accrediting agencies
have held the purse strings to all federal student aid. Today, six regional accrediting
agencies and ten national accrediting agencies act as the gatekeepers of these federal
monies. No college or university can access federal funds without receiving the imprimatur
of one of these recognized accrediting agencies. Proponents of the current system of
accreditation argue that the framework presently in place ultimately benefits both students
and the public at large by fulfilling quality assurance and information signaling functions.
Applying Yandle’s “Baptists and Bootleggers” model, we examine whether the
accreditation system in this country exclusively serves the public interest by ensuring that
institutions are meeting high standards of excellence or whether this system instead serves
private interests. We begin by briefly outlining the history of accreditation in the United
States before explaining the public choice lens through which we explore the issue of
higher education accreditation—Yandle’s Baptists and Bootleggers model. After
highlighting the public interest (“Baptist”) arguments many policy advocates have raised
in favor of accreditation, we consider whether the quantitative and the qualitative evidence
supports the public interest story. We then turn to the public choice (“Bootleggers”)
account of the current accreditation system and argue that the current system of higher
education accreditation serves as a cartel aimed at keeping the price of a college education
high, with little incentives for anything beyond minimum quality standards. We test this
hypothesis by analyzing the opposition raised by universities and accrediting agencies alike
to 34 C.F.R.§ 600.9—a regulation promulgated in October 2010 dealing with the state’s
power to deny federal funds to schools that fail to meet its independent authorization
requirements, even if the school is already accredited by one of the recognized accrediting
agencies. We suggest that the current system of compulsory accreditation should be
abolished and should be replaced by a system run independently by each state. Ultimately,
competition between the states both for students and for new and innovative universities
would result in reforms that the accreditors have no incentive to pursue under the current
system.

1

Pre-print working paper version of Mary Watson Smith and Joshua Hall, “Keeping College Pricey: The Bootlegger
and Baptist Story of Higher Education Accreditation,” Oklahoma City Law Review 44(1) 2019: 33-66. Please see
version of record if quoting or citing.
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Keeping College Pricey: The Bootlegger and
Baptist Story of Higher Education Accreditation
Accreditation, professional licensing, and other tools that regulate the provision of
services have always been something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
they can protect consumers from charlatans and low-quality providers, and in
technical areas where consumers often do not feel able to judge quality
accurately—areas such as emergency medical care—they can provide an assurance
of excellence. On the other hand, however, these tools can also become a barrier to
entry in a market, enabling existing providers to use licensing to thwart
competition. When that happens, licensing does not assure quality, but instead
protects inefficient and inferior products. 2
With these words, Lindsey Burke and Stuart M. Butler frame a question of critical
importance to students, parents, administrators of traditional universities, and entrepreneurs
seeking to change the traditional university model. Who does accreditation really benefit?
Since the passage of the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1952 (the “Korean War GI Bill”), private
accrediting agencies have held the purse strings to all federal student aid. 3 Today, six regional
accrediting agencies and ten national accrediting agencies (including four faith-based agencies)
act as the gatekeepers of these federal monies. 4 No college or university can access federal
funds—nearly $125 billion of aid in 2016 alone—without receiving the imprimatur of one of

2

Lindsey M. Burke & Stuart M. Butler, Accreditation: Removing the Barrier to Higher Education Reform,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Sept. 21, 2012).
3
Andrew Gillen, Daniel L. Bennett & Richard Vedder, The Inmates Running the Asylum? An Analysis of Higher
Education Accreditation, CENTER FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY 4 (Oct. 2010),
http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/Accreditation.pdf.
4
Burke & Butler, supra note 1; Recognized Accrediting Organizations, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION
(Mar. 2013), http://www.chea.org/pdf/CHEA_USDE_AllAccred.pdf.
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these recognized accrediting agencies. 5 But why is that a problem? If these accrediting agencies
were simply acting as disinterested quality controllers, then there would be no problem. After
the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the original “GI Bill”) was passed with very few
restrictions on where veterans could apply these federal dollars, there were widespread reports
that diploma mills were receiving much of this money and leaving veterans without an adequate
education. 6 To address this problem, Congress designed the system of accreditation we know
today—one with the stated public interest purpose of providing quality assurance. 7 Proponents
of the current system of accreditation argue that the framework presently in place ultimately
benefits both students and the public at large by fulfilling quality assurance and information
signaling functions. Applying principles of public choice theory, the goal of this paper is to
determine whether higher education accreditation really lives up to its public interest promise.
Specifically, using Bruce Yandle’s “Baptists and Bootleggers” model, we examine whether the
accreditation system in this country exclusively serves the public interest by ensuring that
institutions are meeting high standards of excellence or whether this system instead serves some
other interest. 8
Before exploring this question in Part I, we briefly outline the history of accreditation in
this country, focusing especially on what the system looked like before the Korean War GI Bill,
how this system changed after 1952, and how the incentives changed in 1965 for universities
seeking federal funds. In Part II, we lay out the public choice lens through which we intend to
explore the issue of higher education accreditation—Yandle’s Baptists and Bootleggers model.

5

FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICE OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2016).
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2.
7
Id.
8
Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, AEI J. ON GOV’T AND SOC’Y
12-16 (1983), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1983/5/v7n3-3.pdf.
6
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We discuss the public interest (“Baptist”) arguments many policy advocates have raised in favor
of accreditation in Part III, and after examining data on student performance and other anecdotal
observations by university administrators and scholars, we consider whether the quantitative and
the qualitative evidence supports the public interest story. In Part IV, we turn to the public
choice (“Bootleggers”) account of the current accreditation system. We hypothesize that the
current system of higher education accreditation serves as a cartel aimed at keeping the price of a
college education high, with little incentives for anything beyond minimum quality standards.
We test this hypothesis by analyzing the opposition raised by universities and accrediting
agencies alike to 34 C.F.R.§ 600.9—a regulation promulgated in October 2010 dealing with the
state’s power to deny federal funds to schools that fail to meet its independent authorization
requirements, even if the school is already accredited by one of the recognized accrediting
agencies. In Part V, considering both the public interest and public choice accounts, we argue
that the current system of compulsory accreditation should be abolished and should be replaced
by a system run independently by each state. Ultimately, competition between the states both for
students and for new and innovative universities would result in reforms that the accreditors have
no incentive to pursue under the current system.

I.

Background: A Brief History of Accreditation in the United States
The accreditation system in this country has come a long way since its inception in the

late nineteenth century. 9 As Andrew Gillen, David Bennett, and Richard Vedder observe,
“Accreditation developed from a need in the late 19th century to define what a college-level

9

Burke & Butler, supra note 1.

Smith/Hall 5
education was and to distinguish institutions that possessed adequate capabilities for undertaking
such studies.” 10 At this time, accreditation was simply a voluntary means for universities to
group themselves together with other similarly situated institutions.11 In an era without school
rankings, accreditation allowed “serious educational institutions to differentiate themselves from
institutions that were ‘colleges’ in name only.” 12 By the turn of the twentieth century, many of
these regional accrediting associations had developed common institutional standards they
required both member institutions and colleges seeking membership to meet. 13 These standards
generally measured “quality” in terms of inputs, and thus, to ensure uniform “quality,” these
accrediting associations required minimum standards in areas such as faculty size, library size,
length of academic programs, and endowment size. 14 Discussing these early standards, Gillen,
Bennett, and Vedder note that because no federal money was at stake at this time, the standards
were not adopted with a public accountability purpose. 15 Rather, accreditors at the time “were
mostly concerned with distinguishing among classes of institutions.” 16 Thus, because
“[c]olleges that could afford vast libraries, credentialed teachers, etc. were quite different from

10

Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 3.
See Joshua C. Hall, Higher-Education Accreditation: Market Regulation or Government Regulation?, 17 THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW 233 (2012).
12
Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work and What Policy Makers Can Do About It, AM. COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES AND
ALUMNI 12 (July 2007) [hereinafter Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work],
http://www.goacta.org/images/download/why_accreditation_doesnt_work.pdf. (“America’s accreditation system
emerged in the late 19th century as a voluntary system for serious educational institutions to differentiate themselves
from institutions that were ‘colleges’ in name only. There was a competition among the private accrediting
organizations that enabled market forces to maintain a necessary level of quality. The knowledge that institutions
could drop accreditation kept associations from becoming dictatorial or attempting inappropriately to influence the
content of education.”).
13
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 3.
14
Id. at 3, 8 (“It is also useful to note that of the standards that were adopted, the vast majority were quantitative
measures of inputs and financial resources, with a few standards pertaining to degree requirements or outcomes.”);
see id. at 11.
15
Id. at 8; see also Judith Eaton, Accreditation, Professional Interest and the Public Interest: Conflict or
Convergence?, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Conflict or
Convergence?], http://www.chea.org/ia/IA_103006v2.htm. . Eaton, the President of CHEA (an advocacy group for
accreditors), reveals that accreditation was created “first and foremost, to serve higher education institutions and
programs.”
16
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 7.
11
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those that could not,” these measures adequately served the accreditors’ purposes. 17 At the same
time, competition among accrediting associations “enabled market forces to maintain a necessary
level of quality.” 18
In 1952, Congress sought to impose a new purpose on these private accrediting
associations—that of ensuring public accountability—and concomitantly set in motion a new
system that no longer relied on market forces to ensure the accreditors’ commitment to quality. 19
Following the passage of the original GI Bill in 1944, there were widespread reports that the
federal student aid granted to veterans was often going to diploma mills that did not provide
these former servicemen with an adequate education. 20 Under the original GI Bill, the only
restriction on an institution’s eligibility to receive federal student aid was that of state
authorization and, at that time, according to Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder, receiving state
authorization was little more than a formal requirement. 21 The Korean War GI Bill of 1952
completely changed the accreditation landscape. No longer were the states the exclusive
regulators of higher education. 22 Instead, the bill required the Commissioner of Education to
publish a list of nationally recognized accrediting associations to which would fall the task of

17

Id. at 7-8.
Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11. See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 13 (“Those
institutions that were accredited by reputable accreditors stood out as better than those that were not (or were
accredited by a lesser accrediting body).”).
19
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 8, 29 (“Some critics of accreditation have thus described the regional
accreditation system as cartel-like, with each accreditor granted a regional monopoly with a guaranteed market for
customers without having to provide much benefit. As a result, there is little to no competition between accreditors
for the right to certify a college or university as eligible for federal student aid.”).
20
John Aubrey Douglass, The Rise of the For-Profit Sector in US Higher Education and the Brazilian Effect, 47
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 242, 243-44 (2012).
21
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2.
22
Barbara Brittingham, Accreditation in the United States: How did we get to where we are?, 145 NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 7, 21 (2009) (“The federal program to recognize accrediting organizations … began
quietly. From what has been called the second GI Bill, providing support for returning veterans from the Korean
War, the federal government began to rely on accreditation organizations to identify institutions educationally
worthy of taxpayer investment in the form of federal financial aid to students.”)
18
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determining the schools eligible to receive federal student aid. 23 Accordingly, Commissioner Ed
McGrath later named the six accrediting agencies that currently oversee the regional
accreditation system that prevails today. 24
Despite assuming this new public accountability function, the standards employed by the
agencies remained relatively unchanged. 25 As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder put it, “To get
accredited, one basically had to mimic other colleges in terms of input usage.” 26 These costly
requirements discouraged both diploma mills and legitimate upstart colleges from seeking
accreditation. 27 Because the federal funds dispersed at this time were both limited and
temporary, it was simply not worth it to these smaller institutions to go through the costly
process of accreditation. 28 In 1965, with the passage of the Higher Education Act (“HEA”), the
federal government established a permanent system of federal student aid that promised massive
amounts of federal funds to accredited colleges and universities, who alone were eligible to
receive it. 29 If the 1952 Korean War GI Bill changed the accreditation landscape, then the 1965
HEA completely changed the game. As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder observe, “Whereas in
earlier years colleges would only take part in accreditation if the benefits (e.g. signaling quality

23

Matthew W. Finkin, Federal Reliance on Voluntary Accreditation: The Power to Recognize as the Power to
Regulate, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 339, 346 (1973).
24
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2. Although not required by the 1952 Korean War GI Bill, the regional
accreditation system established by the Commissioner of Education meant the end of competition between
accreditors for member universities and member colleges.
25
Id. at 9.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 4-5.
28
Id.; see also Letter from R.W. Kent, Director, Essex County Vocational Schools, to H. Alexander Smith, U.S.
Senator (May 23, 1952) in Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Veterans’ Education and Rehabilitation
Benefits of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare United States Senate, 82nd Cong. 102 (1952) (“It would be
very easy for a group of fly-by-night profit schools to set up an accrediting agency that would look good on the
surface but would accredit substandard schools and thereby dodge completely the provision of this section…I realize
that under present conditions, where we are not in an all-out shooting war that the number of veterans involved may
not be large enough to induce some of the abuses we had under the old GI bill. However, it seems to me this new
legislation should be made foolproof so that if we should get into a shooting war, we will be prepared to prevent
repetition of these abuses.”).
29
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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and/or helping the institution) outweighed the costs, accreditation was now viewed as a near
necessity, regardless of its benefits in these dimensions.” 30 Since 1965, universities of all kinds
have had a powerful incentive to pursue accreditation, and the accrediting agencies have enjoyed
a captive audience on whom to impose their standards. 31

II.

The Public Interest Story and Its Problems
A.

What Public Goods Do Accreditors Claim to Provide?

In order to determine whether or not the current system of accreditation has lived up to its
public interest promise, we must examine what exactly that public interest promise is. What
public goods do accreditors claim to provide?
According to Judith Eaton, a leading advocate in favor of accreditation and the President
of the Council of Higher Education Accreditation (“CHEA”), 32 “When accreditation was created
100 years ago, it sought, first and foremost, to serve higher education institutions and
programs.” 33 As Eaton explains, “Accreditation was and is routinely acknowledged by higher

30

Id. at 6.
See id. at 4 (“[W]ith the passage of the 1965 Higher Education Act (HEA), accreditation would become a near
necessity.”); Burke & Butler, supra note 1 (“Once a voluntary decision on the part of universities, accreditation is
now a de facto requirement for institutions to be eligible even to open their doors or for their students to receive
federal aid.”); Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11, at 12 (“Because this happened at a time when the
importance of student aid in college budgets was growing, accreditation changed from a voluntary service to a
nearly universal obligatory review. Since students who attend unaccredited colleges are ineligible for federal
student aid, a loss of or failure to receive ‘accredited’ status would be a death knell for many institutions.”).
32
The Council of Higher Education Accreditation (“CHEA”) is a “national advocate and institutional voice for
promoting academic quality through accreditation.” CHEA At-A-Glance, Council of Higher Educ. Accreditation,
https://www.chea.org/userfiles/uploads/chea-at-a-glance_2015.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). With membership
that consists of three thousand degree-granting member institutions, it is the largest institutional higher education
membership organization in the United States. Id.
33
Conflict or Convergence?, supra note 14; see also Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 4 (“By 1945, the
North Central Association’s rhetoric had shifted from that of assuring high quality to that of ‘providing service’ to
its member institutions. During this time, accreditation increasingly sought to accomplish continued improvement in
higher education rather than the rigid enforcement of universal standards. In doing so, a new mission for
31
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education as its primary means to assure academic quality.” 34 Thus, accreditation serves the
higher education community by acting as a mechanism for academic quality assurance and for
quality improvement. 35
Because, as accreditors argue, accreditation signals academic quality, 36 accreditors serve
the public interest by identifying to students, to the federal government, and to members of the
private sector those institutions or programs that meet “at least threshold standards for [their]
facult[ies], curricul[a], student services, and libraries.” 37 Accreditation benefits consumers by
separating those institutions they can trust from those they cannot trust. Indeed, as a recent
CHEA promotional video put it, “Being accredited means you can trust what the school or
program tells you about its courses, its teachers, the services it provides, and what tuition and
other fees will cost.” 38 Since 1952, accreditation has also served an important function for the
government. 39 With over $100 billion disbursed every year in federal student aid, accreditors
provide assurance to the government that only quality institutions have access to these federal

accreditation was added: In addition to sorting colleges by quality as before, it was now also supposed to help
institutions improve.”).
34
Conflict or Convergence?, supra note 14; see also Accreditation, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC.,
http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (“The goal of accreditation is to ensure that education
provided by institutions of higher education meets acceptable levels of quality. Accrediting agencies, which are
private educational associations of regional or national scope, develop evaluation criteria and conduct peer
evaluations to assess whether or not those criteria are met.”).
35
Conflict or Convergence?, supra note 14 (“[A]ccreditation itself is a community of professionals, men and women
who have considerable expertise and experience in quality review, assessment, quality assurance and quality
improvement.”).
36
Judith Eaton, Accreditation and Recognition in the United States, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION 18
(2016) [hereinafter Accreditation and Recognition], http://www.chea.org/userfiles/uploads/AccredRecogUS.pdf
(“Accreditation is the primary means by which colleges, universities, and programs assure quality to students and
the public.”).
37
Id.
38
Accreditation and Its Value to You, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION (Feb. 3, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGGfBNTLSBI.
39
See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 4.
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dollars. 40 Further, accreditation “[e]ngender[s] private sector confidence” in that it provides
employers with a tool for measuring the credentials of job applicants and for deciding whether to
offer tuition support to employees pursuing additional education. 41
All of the benefits cited by accreditors, however, depend critically on the efficacy of the
accreditor’s quality assurance measures. Is an accrediting agency’s stamp of approval actually
reflective of an institution’s quality? 42
B.

Is Accreditation an Accurate Indicator of Institutional Quality?

The accrediting agencies would respond with a resounding “yes!” But, it is important to
understand how these agencies measure “quality.” As many scholars and commentators have
noted, the accrediting agencies largely measure “quality” in terms of inputs 43—that is, for

40

Accreditation and Recognition, supra note 35, at 21 (“It adds value to the society through assuring quality,
enabling government to make sound judgments about the use of public funds, aiding the private sector in decisions
about financial support and easing transfer of credit.”).
41
Id. at 19.
42
See Accreditation and Its Value to You, supra note 36 (“When a college, university, or vocational school says that
it is ‘accredited,’ it is saying it has been reviewed by experts and has a seal of approval.”).
43
See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 9; Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11, at 6; Burke &
Butler, supra note 1; George C. Leef & Roxana D. Burris, Can Accreditation Live Up to Its Promise?, AM. COUNCIL
OF TRUSTEES AND ALUMNI 13 (Jul. 2002),
http://www.goacta.org/images/download/can_accreditation_live_up_to_its_promise.pdf.
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example, the size of an institution’s physical infrastructure, 44 the size of its non-faculty staff, 45
the size of its faculty, 46 the workload intensity both of faculty and of administrative staff, 47 the
qualifications of faculty, 48 the length of degree programs, 49 and the institution’s commitment to

44
See, e.g., 2013 Handbook of Accreditation, W. ASSOC. OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES (2013) [hereinafter WASC
Handbook], https://www.wscuc.org/book/export/html/924 (“3.5 The institution provides access to information and
technology resources sufficient in scope, quality, currency, and kind at physical sites and online, as appropriate, to
support its academic offerings and the research and scholarship of its faculty, staff, and students. These information
resources, services, and facilities are consistent with the institution’s educational objectives and are aligned with
student learning outcomes.”); Resource Manual for the Principles of Accreditation: Foundations for Quality
Enhancement, S. ASSOC. OF COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS COMMISSION ON COLLEGES 30 (2012) [hereinafter SACS
Manual], http://www.sacscoc.org/pdf/Resource%20Manual.pdf (“2.11.2. The institution has adequate physical
resources to support the mission of the institution and the scope of its programs and services.”); id. at 84 (“3.11.3.
The institution operates and maintains physical facilities, both on and off campus, that appropriately serve the needs
of the institution’s educational programs, support services, and other mission-related activities.”); Northwest
Commission on Colleges and Universities Standards for Accreditation, N.W. COMMISSION ON COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES (2010) [hereinafter NWCCU Standards], http://www.nwccu.org/accreditation/standardspolicies/standards/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (2.G.1 Consistent with its mission, core themes, and characteristics,
the institution creates and maintains physical facilities that are accessible, safe, secure, and sufficient in quantity and
quality to ensure healthful learning and working environments that support the institution’s mission, programs, and
services”); id. (“2.G. 3 The institution develops, implements, and reviews regularly a master plan for its physical
development that is consistent with its mission, core themes, and long-range educational and financial plans.”).
45
See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 77 (institution must have a “sufficient number” of qualified library
staff); id. at 79 (institution must have a “sufficient number” of qualified student affairs staff); WASC Handbook,
supra note 43, ¶3.1 (institution must have “sufficient number” of staff); NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at ¶
2.B.1 (“sufficient number of qualified personnel”).
46
See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 24 (“2.8. The number of full-time faculty members is adequate to
support the mission of the institution and to ensure the quality and integrity of each of its academic programs”);
WASC Handbook, supra note 43, at 18 (“3.1…. The faculty and staff are sufficient in number, professional
qualification, and diversity to achieve the institution’s educational objectives, establish and oversee academic
policies, and ensure the integrity and continuity of its academic and co-curricular programs wherever and however
delivered..”); NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at ¶ 2.B.4 (institution employs appropriately qualified faculty
sufficient in number).
47
See, e.g., WASC Handbook, supra note 43 (“3.2 Faculty and staff recruitment, hiring, orientation, workload,
incentives, and evaluation practices are aligned with institutional purposes and educational objectives.”) (emphasis
added); see also NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at ¶ 2.B.5 (“Faculty responsibilities and workloads are
commensurate with the institution’s expectations for teaching, service, scholarship, research, and/or artistic
creation.”).
48
See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 68 (“3.5.4. At least 25 percent of the course hours in each major at the
baccalaureate level are taught by faculty members holding an appropriate terminal degree, usually the earned
doctorate, or the equivalent of the terminal degree.”); id. at 72 (“3.7.2…. When determining acceptable
qualifications of its faculty, an institution gives primary consideration to the highest earned degree in the
discipline.”).
49
See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 18 (associate’s degrees must be at least 60 hours or the equivalent,
bachelor’s degrees must be at least 120 hours or the equivalent, master’s degrees must be at least 30 hours or the
equivalent, and institutions must provide a justification for “all degrees that include fewer than the required number
of semester hours or its equivalent unit.”); id. at 20 (institution must require fifteen hours of “general education”
courses for an associate’s degree and thirty hours of such courses for a bachelor’s degree); NWCCU Standards,
supra note 43, at ¶ 2.C.9.
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strategic planning for the future. 50 While these requirements do succeed in driving up the cost of
education, they are dubious measures of an institution’s capacity to teach students meaningful
skills.51 As Leef and Burris argue,
The accreditation system is not based on an evaluation of the results of an
institution, but rather upon an evaluation of its inputs and processes. If the inputs
and processes look good, acceptable educational quality is assumed. It is as if an
organization decided which automobiles would be allowed to be sold by checking
to make sure that each car model had tires, doors, an engine and so forth and had
been assembled by workers with proper training—but without actually driving
any cars. 52
This is not to say that the accrediting agencies completely ignore student outcomes. In response
to concerns that the accrediting agencies were not properly gauging academic quality, in 1992,
Congress passed a new amendment to the Higher Education Act, requiring accreditors to chart
student learning outcomes. 53 As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder suggest, however, “the college
lobby has ensured that these are self designed assessments.” 54 In other words, although an
accreditor now must obtain data from institutions concerning student achievement, the standards
the institution must meet are based on the school’s own evaluation of its success at meeting the

50

See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 16 (“The institution engages in ongoing, integrated, and institutionwide
research-based planning and evaluation processes that (1) incorporate a systematic review of institutional mission,
goals, and outcomes; (2) result in continuing improvement in institutional quality; and (3) demonstrate the
institution is effectively accomplishing its mission.”); NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at § 3.A.
51
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 9 (“It should go without saying that just because a university spends
enough money on libraries or research, or has ‘low enough’ teaching loads does not guarantee that it is providing an
education worth the public’s (or even the student’s personal) investment.”).
52
Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 7.
53
See Matthew W. Finkin, The Unfolding Tendency in the Federal Relationship to Private Accreditation in Higher
Education, 57 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 89, 102-03 (1994).
54
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 9.
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goals that it set for itself. 55 The problem with this method of evaluation, as Leef and Burris
reason, is that it gives an institution the incentive to cheat on quality:
The difficulty with reliance on schools themselves to police educational quality is
that they have a strong incentive to make themselves look good to accreditors
(and other outside observers), while offering the kind of easy, entertaining courses
that many students expect and even demand. Schools will comply with whatever
standards the accreditors may write regarding student achievement, while at the
same time continuing to offer the sort of easy-going courses that satisfy most
students. 56
Because the accreditors only require this vague self-policing, agencies have no way of ensuring
uniform educational outcomes across institutions. 57 Further, the accrediting agencies do not
55

Id. at 9-10; see, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 93 (“4.1. The institution evaluates success with respect to
student achievement consistent with its mission. Criteria may include: enrollment data; retention, graduation, course
completion, and job placement rates; state licensing examinations; student portfolios; or other means of
demonstrating achievement of goals.”); Standards for Accreditation, NEW ENGLAND ASSOC. OF SCHOOLS AND
COLLEGES § 2.6 (2016) [hereinafter NEASC Standards], https://cihe.neasc.org/standards-policies/standardsaccreditation/standards-effective-july-1-2016 (“The institution regularly and systematically evaluates the
achievement of its mission and purposes, giving primary focus to the realization of its educational objectives. Its
system of evaluation is designed to provide valid information to support institutional improvement. The institution’s
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undertake a course-by-course evaluation of a school’s programs to ensure overall academic
rigor. 58 In short, much of the “quality” that accrediting agencies seek to maximize (e.g.,
financial resources, faculty staffing levels, physical infrastructure is not meaningful relative to
student learning and performance—performance that has markedly declined in recent years. 59
C. Weighing the Costs of Accreditation.
Having considered the benefits of accreditation apart from the access it provides to
federal funds, we now briefly consider its costs. Accreditation imposes both direct and indirect
costs on colleges and universities. 60 Whereas direct costs include expenditures for membership
fees, site visits, and evaluations, indirect costs involve the much more substantial spending
necessary to comply with an accreditor’s recommendation (e.g., the cost of building a new
building at the recommendation of an agency). 61 According to Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, the
direct yearly cost to universities is fairly low—around $63,000 per institution. 62
The indirect costs of compliance, however, are both far more substantial and far more
difficult to quantify as they also entail significant opportunity costs. 63 As ACTA points out, with
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the decreasing number of professors available to teach courses, some universities have had to
consolidate class sections, increasing the size of classes to make up for the short fall. 64 Thus,
accrediting mandates have forced many students to bear the cost of learning in larger classes.
Although there has been little empirical research done as to what effect larger class sizes have on
a college student’s ability to learn, 65 intuitively, as one University of Richmond study recently
found with respect to college business classes, larger class sizes affect the clarity of
presentations, the effectiveness of teaching methods, the instructor’s ability to keep students
interested, and the timeliness of feedback. 66
The cost to new universities of obtaining accreditation is substantial. As Michael
Clifford, an investor in for-profit colleges, has estimated, the cost to a new school to obtain
accreditation is about $10 million and ten years of effort with “only a 50-50 chance of
success.” 67 But, it is not solely new schools that bear these costs. Even schools with pristine
academic credentials bear substantial costs as a result of accreditation. Stanford University,
universally ranked as one of the top five universities in the world, spends roughly eight cents of
every tuition dollar on accreditation. 68 Fortunately, the costs imposed by accreditation do not

64

Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11, at 9.
See Eric P. Bettinger &Bridget Terry Long, Mass Instruction or Higher Learning? The Impact of College Class
Size on Student Retention and Graduation, 13 EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 97-118 (Winter 2018) (finding an
increase in college class size increases dropout rates and a reduction in on-time degree completion); Giacomo De
Giorgi, Michele Pellizzari & William Gui Woolston, Class Size and Class Heterogeneity, 10 J. OF EUR. ECON.
ASS’N 795-830 (2012) (Italian study finding significantly lower wages and less achievement after graduation
correlated with how large introductory lectures were).
66
James Monk & Robert Schmidt, The Impact of Class Size and Numbers of Students on Outcomes in Higher
Education, 2011(11) B.E. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY,
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=economics-faculty-publications..
67
See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 22; Daniel Golden, Your Taxes Support For-Profits as They Buy
Colleges, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2010). As Clifford reveals in his interview with Golden, he has participated in the
acquisition of four debt-ridden non-profit universities. Clifford has found that buying these non-profit colleges is the
most cost-effective way for a for-profit school to obtain accreditation.
68
Richard DeMillo, Accreditation—or Real Quality Assurance?, POPE CENTER (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article.html?id=2792; see also Shirley M. Tilghman, President, Princeton
University, Remarks at Reinvention Center Conference (Nov. 9, 2012) (“Let me quote from a letter that John
Etchemendy, the provost of Stanford University, sent to WASC last year, highlighting their experience with
65

Smith/Hall 16
threaten the very existence of schools like Stanford or Princeton. As Richard Vedder suggests,
one cannot say the same for smaller liberal arts colleges like Urbana University. 69 With forty-one
percent of its students receiving Pell Grants and an endowment of less than $3,000 per student,
Urbana certainly could not survive without accreditation. 70 Yet, the cost of maintaining
accreditation looms large: “[O]ften inane accreditation procedures that are minor annoyances to
Princeton can be significant cost factors to a school like Urbana.” 71
With large cost and unclear benefits in terms of quality assurance, one must wonder why
such a system persists. Why would Congress and why would regulated institutions want such an
inefficient system?
III.

Bootleggers and Baptists
In 1983, Bruce Yandle asked himself this same question as he reflected on the tendency

of government officials to choose the highest cost regulatory approach they can find. 72 He
recalled that, at first, he thought that this behavior suggested a tremendous ignorance of basic
economic principles on the part of these regulators. 73 As he conversed with many of them,
however, he learned to his surprise that “many regulators knew quite a bit about economics.” 74
Even more shocking, after talking with many industry representatives, he learned that those
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regulated “were not always opposed to the costly rules [imposed by these government regulators]
and occasionally were even fearful that we would succeed in getting rid of some of them.” 75
Initially, these insights puzzled Yandle. 76 Why would the government choose to implement
policies that seem more costly when more efficient approaches were available? And why would
regulated industries prefer these costly measures?
Considering these insights, Yandle developed a new way of understanding the incentives
that drive both the regulators and the regulated. Originally, he had thought that “the regulators
really intended to minimize costs but somehow proceeded to make crazy mistakes.” 77 Under his
new theory, he “began to assume that they were not trying to minimize costs at all—at least not
the costs [he] had been concerned with.” 78 Instead, the regulators were concerned with
minimizing their costs—that is, the costs of making a mistake, the costs of enforcement, and
political costs. 79 Regulators, Yandle suggested, often prefer simple rules applied across the
board because “simple rules…require fewer decisions where mistakes can be made.” 80
Likewise, simple rules are easier to enforce than those that are more complex. 81 Such rules also
might appear to be more equitable. 82Because regulators are usually accountable in some way to
legislators, the appearance of fairness is very important as a “legislator is likely to be unhappy
with regulators…who fail, in the legislator’s view, to remember the industries and the workers in
his area.” 83 Regulated industries, on the other hand, “want protection from competition, from
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technological change, and from losses that threaten profits and jobs.” 84 The right kind of
regulations can accomplish all of these anticompetitive goals, while at the same time “giving the
citizenry the impression that the only goal is to serve the public interest.” 85 Yandle calls this
idea the “Bootleggers and Baptists” theory of regulation:
Bootleggers, you will remember, support Sunday closing laws that shut down all
the local bars and liquor stores. Baptists support the same laws and lobby
vigorously for them. Both parties gain, while the regulators are content because
the law is easy to administer. 86
With the government and private interest groups benefiting as a result of a given anticompetitive
law that appears to serve the public interest, the barriers to meaningful reform are institutional—
that is, unless there are changes in the demand and in the supply of regulation. 87
Given the inefficiency and the ineffectiveness of the current higher education
accreditation system, the question remains—does Yandle’s Bootleggers and Baptists theory have
any application to the system of higher education accreditation as we know it?
IV.
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Under Yandle’s theory, the government and interests groups have different reasons for
promoting regulations that are inefficient overall. Generally speaking, interests groups want
protection from competition, and regulators want to minimize their costs. 88 But, key to a good
Bootleggers and Baptists story is “an overarching public concern to be addressed (like the
problem of alcohol) whose ‘solution’ allows resources to be distributed from the public purse to
particular groups or from one group to another (as from bartenders to bootleggers).” 89 In Section
II. A., we discussed some of these public concerns when we considered the public goods—such
as quality assurance and information-signaling—that accreditation purportedly provides. We
now reflect on the accrediting agencies’ and the government’s interests in the current
accreditation system in order to gauge how well Yandle’s story applies in this context.
Unlike most other regulated sectors, higher education is primarily self-regulated. 90 In
other words, while the Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, sets the emission
standards that apply to businesses, accrediting commissions made up of members elected by
member institutions set the standards for accreditation and thereby determine whether or not a
given university can access federal funds. 91 While advocates for accreditation argue that this
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structure is one of the strengths of accreditation, 92 even these advocates recognize that there is, at
the very least, a potential for conflict. 93 As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder have suggested,
however, this potential has long been realized:
One might even view accreditation as a “cartel” made up of various participants
with the goal of restricting competition from non-members of the cartel.
Ultimately, it’s not surprising that “a system that is created, maintained, paid for
and governed by institutions is necessarily more likely to look out for institutional
interests.” One of the ways in which they do so is by keeping standards low:
“when the people who decide what constitutes academic quality will themselves
be judged on academic quality, it’s no wonder that the bar is set low.” 94
In this view, accrediting agencies protect institutional interests by keeping barriers to entry high,
such that member universities face little competition from emerging non-member universities,
and by keeping quality standards among member institutions low. Thus, accrediting standards
requiring a high-level of expensive inputs (e.g., an institution’s physical infrastructure, the size
of its faculty and its non-faculty staff) make accreditation practically unattainable for many
upstart universities. 95 At the same time, with quality monitored by accrediting commissions
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composed of member institution electors—many of whom are often faculty or staff of these
institutions—the commissions on their own have little incentive to raise quality standards in a
meaningful way for fear that their own institutions could not meet those standards. Further,
individually, commissioners are accountable to no one but the member institutions who elect
them. Therefore, the commission, as a whole, has an incentive not to raise standards higher than
those that these institutions will be willing to meet. The current system supports this hypothesis,
as accreditors do not judge the “quality” of a university based on clear objective criteria. Rather,
the agencies base its judgments about an institution’s quality on its inputs 96 and on the
institution’s own subjective judgment as to how it has met the goals that an institution has set for
itself. 97
If, as was traditionally the case, accreditation is the only practical impediment to
obtaining federal funds, 98 the accrediting agencies also have an effective means of punishing
defection—the threat of losing (or never gaining) accreditation and the federal funds that come
with it. 99 Although the agencies have rarely wielded this tool for reasons of educational
quality, 100 in recent years, these agencies have not been shy about threatening to punish schools
for reasons that have nothing to do with academics or with quality.
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In 2007, for instance, the University of California drew fire from Western Association of
Schools and Colleges (“WASC”) when it attempted to address runaway administrative costs by
making modest salary and benefit changes. 101 For years, school administrators had accepted
exorbitant salaries that had gone unapproved by the university’s Board of Regents as required by
the school’s compensation policy. 102 As the Board attempted to deal with this problem, WASC
also forced it to expend precious time and resources responding to WASC’s criticisms, including
the complaint that “the Regents are sometimes unnecessarily harsh in their treatment of UC
administrators, faculty, and staff.” 103
Similarly, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (“SACS”) officially
sanctioned the University of Virginia (“UVA”) and placed its accreditation on warning status.
Why? It was not because of academic quality. Indeed, UVA is consistently ranked among the
top universities in the country. 104 Rather, the SACS official sanction came as a result of its
Board of Visitors’ decision to remove the university president, Teresa Sullivan, in favor of one
more focused on cost controls. 105 Between 2003 and 2009, administrative costs at the university
had risen 68.9% compared to the 42.4% rise in spending on teaching. 106 At the same time,
alumni giving had dropped by almost half. In 2010, the Board had hired Ms. Sullivan to put
UVA’s fiscal house in order. 107 After her election, however, Ms. Sullivan made it clear that she
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was not going to take aggressive measures to effect full-scale reform. 108 Sullivan preferred, as
she called it, an “incrementalist approach.” 109 Indeed, in March 2011, she remarked that UVA
was “pretty lean” and that she “worr[ied] about getting leaner.” 110 Meanwhile, the Board was
concerned that the university was falling behind other top universities such as Harvard and MIT
who had entered the digital age with innovative online offerings. 111 It also demanded more
accountability in terms of faculty productivity and academic quality. 112 In June 2012, Helen
Dragas, UVA Rector, asked for Sullivan’s resignation on behalf of a supermajority of the
Board. 113 This decision was supported by the UVA Faculty Senate which passed a noconfidence vote shortly after Dragas asked for Sullivan’s resignation. 114 Although the Board
later reversed this decision, SACS sanctioned UVA, placing its accreditation status up for review
based on the university’s failure “to demonstrate compliance with Core Requirement 2.2
(Governing board) and Comprehensive Standard 3.7.5 (Faculty role in governance) of the
Principles of Accreditation.” 115 Again, as Executive Vice President and Provost John D. Simon
noted in the university’s official statement, “This action does not imply any criticism of the
University's academic quality and programs.” 116 Instead, by this action, SACS effectively
diverted the university’s focus from critical issues of quality and of cost-containment to
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unrelated issues of university governance. Rather than developing smart and aggressive
measures to balance fiscal concerns and to innovate, the Board was “provid[ing] clarity on
procedures for electing and removing presidents, set[ting] up comprehensive guidelines for
evaluating a president’s performance, and provid[ing] more direct involvement by faculty in
board deliberations.” 117 It was on defense to protect UVA’s accreditation on which depended
both its access to federal funds and, in a very real way, its survival.
The tremendous lengths that innovative online universities, such as Western Governors’
University (WGU), 118 have had to endure in order to obtain accreditation further evidences the
barriers that accreditors have erected to protect their institutional interests—barriers that have
prevented lower cost and higher quality education. 119 WGU began as an idea conceived at a
meeting of the Western Governors Association in 1995. 120 These state governors were
concerned that their state university systems were not providing enough skilled graduates to
ensure the quality workforce that the states needed. 121 With the costs of education rising and
state funds dwindling, these governors wanted to develop an innovative system that actually
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expanded access to educational opportunities. 122 Further, to ensure the skill of graduates, they
wanted a system that would reward competency, not time spent in the classroom. 123 To realize
this dream, ten governors donated $100,000 dollars apiece to establish WGU, a non-profit,
private university with only online course offerings. 124 But, this money would be the only state
funding the university would receive. 125 Although the governors were hesitant to pursue
accreditation as it “was part of the problem, not the solution,” 126 it became clear that in order to
compete with other institutions and to obtain some credibility in the academic arena they had to
pursue accreditation. 127 They also hoped that they might effect educational change if they
attempted to work within the accreditation system. 128 The process to obtain regional
accreditation, however, took so long—seven years—that it is a wonder that the school was able
to remain open. 129 By 2000, two years after WGU began accepting applications, the entire
university had only two hundred students. 130 As WGU slogged through the bureaucratic
accrediting process, many other online universities bypassed the entire system by purchasing
bankrupt traditional universities and assuming their accreditation. 131Although WGU eventually
obtained accreditation and has since flourished with over 25,000 students enrolled as of 2011, 132
as Chip Johnstone, Provost and Academic Vice President of WGU, writes, “It will be a rare
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institution, especially a private one, that can sustain itself throughout the five to eight years that it
ordinarily takes to achieve initial regional accreditation. That is the one way in which the
regional process most threatens the survival of innovation.” 133
Of course, in order for the accrediting agencies to have the enormous power it now
enjoys over federal dollars, they must have the federal government’s blessing. As Yandle
suggested, a government regulator often chooses the approach that minimizes its own costs,
regardless of how inefficient that approach might be overall. 134 Indeed, according to Leef and
Burris, a majority in both houses of Congress chose to delegate this power over federal funds to
these private accreditors because they “fear[ed] a backlash from the education community if the
government set standards for colleges and universities.” 135 Consistent with Yandle’s theory,
legislators chose a system that minimized their own political liability. 136 Originally, the system
also minimized costs of enforcement because, under the 1952 Korean War GI Bill, the
Commissioner of Education needed only to designate a list of accrediting agencies he determined
to be reliable authorities. 137 As the years have gone by and the failures of the accreditation
system have become more and more evident, the costs to the government have changed and, as a
result, it has become increasingly involved in regulating these private regulators of higher
education. 138 Indeed, as Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder observe, there was even some discussion
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prior to the 1992 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act to sever completely the tie
between accreditation and federal funding. 139 Although Congress did not take this tack, it
responded with the 1992 Amendments “designed to strengthen the requirements that accrediting
agencies would have to meet in order to be recognized by the Department of Education.” 140
Among these Amendments were provisions requiring the accrediting agencies “to use certain
procedures, including periodic on-site inspections and reviews, well-trained and knowledgeable
accreditation teams, and to make public the information on their standards, appeal procedures,
and the accreditation status of each institution under its jurisdiction.” 141
The government’s increasing involvement in accreditation remains consistent with
Yandle’s theory. The government, he explained, might begin to change its approach to
regulation in response to changes in the supply and in the demand for regulation. 142 Prior to the
1992 Amendments, a high annual rate of default on federally guaranteed student loans and an
impression that the accreditation system was partly to blame changed the supply and the demand
for government oversight over accreditation. 143 The government has progressively increased its
oversight of accrediting agencies by requiring the accreditors to fulfill a number of requirements
in order for them to be recognized accrediting agencies by the Department of Education. 144
The higher education community’s response to these heightened requirements further
suggests that quality assurance is not foremost in these accreditors’ minds. Indeed, on October
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29, 2010, the Department of Education promulgated 34 C.F.R. §600.9—a regulation that laid out
minimum requirements that a state must follow in order for it to authorize a post-secondary
school. 145 Prior to promulgating this regulation, state authorization was a requirement to
receiving federal funds. 146 What licensure actually entailed, however, was left to the discretion
of the state. As the Department of Education noted in responding to comments concerning §
600.9, it issued this regulation because of concerns that states were not providing “adequate
oversight.” 147 To address these concerns, this regulation would require the states to serve as “an
additional check on institutional integrity.” 148 Specifically, the regulation required states to
establish a third-party “process to review and appropriately act on complaints concerning the
institution including enforcing applicable State laws.” 149 It also conditioned state licensure on
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the institution’s compliance with “any applicable State approval or licensure requirements.” 150
Section 600.9 did not give the state any new power. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), the states
already had the power to withhold federal funds by refusing to license an institution of higher
education. 151 Rather, the regulation defined the “minimum standards” that the state must meet in
order to fulfill the duty Congress delegated to the state to authorize institutions eligible to receive
federal funds. 152 In effect, because the accreditors’ consistent failure with respect to quality
assurance, the Department of Education appealed to the states to step up and to provide that
“additional check on institutional integrity” that the Higher Education Act of 1965 and its
subsequent reauthorizations envisioned. 153
The response from the accreditation community was blistering. Although the regulation
gave states no new authority, accreditors were up in arms. 154 Molly Corbett Broad, President of
the American Council on Education, wrote a letter on behalf of sixty higher education
associations and accrediting organizations to Department of Education Secretary Arne Duncan,
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asking the Secretary to rescind § 600.9 in its entirety. 155 In similar letters to the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Senate Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions Committee, Broad appealed to Congress to take action to expressly repeal these
regulations. 156 In particular, she criticized the state authorization provision as “a significant
intrusion into prerogatives properly reserved to the states.” 157 Despite Ms. Broad’s rhetorically
appealing assertion that § 600.9 removed discretion from the states, the text of the regulation
belies her argument. Indeed, under § 600.9 (a) (1) (i) (B), a state “may exempt the institution
from any State approval or licensure requirements based on the institution's accreditation by one
or more accrediting agencies recognized by the Secretary or based upon the institution being in
operation for at least 20 years.” 158 The discretion to grant or deny that exemption, however, rests
with the state. Further, although the regulation does require the state to set up a “process to
review and appropriately act on complaints concerning the institution including enforcing
applicable State laws,” the regulation does not require that the state pass any particular
regulations or establish any particular process. 159 This regulation did not threaten state
autonomy—it threatened the accreditors’ supremacy.
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While the 1992 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act had sought to improve
quality by instituting controls over the accrediting agencies themselves 160—controls that, as we
have discussed, the accrediting agencies could evade by putting in place vague and meaningless
quality standards—this new Department of Education regulation actually threatened the status
quo by requiring the state to fill its role as an overseer of quality independent of the accrediting
agencies. 161 As Judith S. Eaton lamented, § 600.9 “may require that states not only authorize
institutions to operate but now also monitor that operation, affecting both public and private
institutions, in some cases mirroring accreditation.” 162 Ultimately, this was the fear—that the
government had set up an independent system that “mirrored” accreditation, that states could
undermine the accreditation cartel if they chose to take a more active role in overseeing higher
education. In Broad’s letters to the House and Senate Committees on higher education, she
bristled at the thought of “inappropriate state involvement in the academic decision-making of
private non-profit institutions, in particular for religiously affiliated institutions.” 163 What Broad
left unsaid in this letter—written on behalf of five of the six regional accreditors—is that, as
SACS’ recent sanctioning of the University of Virginia suggests, “inappropriate involvement in
the academic decision-making” had hitherto been the exclusive province of the accrediting
agencies. While Broad’s parade of horribles includes concerns about the plight of non-profit
religious affiliated institutions, she failed to mention that the accreditors themselves have a long
history of inappropriately interfering in the prerogatives of non-profit religious institutions. In
the early 1990s, for instance, WASC held up the reaccreditation of St. Thomas Aquinas College,
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an eminent conservative Catholic institution known for its rigorous Great Books program,
because it refused to allow accreditors “to single out minority students for a special meeting with
the [accrediting] team members in order to address special ‘minority issues.’” 164 The college
took this stand because it was its policy, grounded in the intellectual tradition to which the school
is so devoted, to deal with students without regard to their race. 165 Although WASC ultimately
relented and reaccredited Aquinas in 1993, 166 the incident exemplifies a critical point relative to
the concerns that Broad raises in her letters to Congress. The accrediting agencies are not
concerned about institutional autonomy. They are not concerned about the plight of non-profit
religious institutions of higher learning. They are concerned about state oversight undermining
the status quo.
For decades, the accreditors have enjoyed a system by which quality standards have
remained low while the costs of complying with these standards have remained high.
Competition from an independent state system of oversight threatens in a number of ways the
comfortable cartel the accreditors have managed for all of these years. First, if state oversight
vastly improves the quality of colleges and universities in an observable manner, Congress could
decide to scrap entirely the private accreditation condition for obtaining federal funds, as
members of Congress considered doing in 1992. 167 While private accreditation would likely
remain, an institution’s incentive to seek it would vastly change, as would the accreditors’ ability
to extract monopoly rents from member institutions. 168 Second, if the states took seriously their

164

Linda Seebach, Accreditation Standards Threaten Diversity of Opinion on University Campuses, Los Angeles
Daily News (4 November 1993).
165
Id; M. Ali Raza, A Janell Anderson, & Harry Glynn, The Ups and Downs of Affirmative Action Preferences,
Greenwood Publishing (1999), p. 116.
166
Id.
167
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 5.
168
Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 31 (“Accreditation would once again be completely voluntary, and
because accreditors would nolonger have quasi-governmental power, they could no longer essentially force

Smith/Hall 33
role of authorizing institutions of higher education and ensuring educational quality, state
licensure could become an independent and meaningful mark of quality for consumers,
employers, and other graduate institutions. Thus, schools—such as Christendom College,
Thomas Aquinas College, and Hillsdale College—that choose not to accept federal funds 169
could forego the costly accreditation process entirely by obtaining an independent stamp of
quality assurance from the states in which they operate. This development would again
eliminate the accreditors’ ability to extract rents from such institutions.
The question remains, however, would a system of strong state involvement in higher
education quality assurance be desirable? Going forward, how should Congress reform the
system?

V.

Recommendations
The current system of higher education quality assurance is broken. In the past the

Department of Education has taken a step toward fixing these issues by encouraging stronger
state involvement in quality assurance through its promulgation of § 600.9. We recommend,
however, that Congress go a step further by completely severing the tie between eligibility to
accept federal funds and higher education accreditation. Congress should fully entrust the job of
quality assurance to the states, with state authorization being the only prerequisite for eligibility
to receive federal dollars. Such a proposal would likely receive the same kind of backlash that
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the promulgation of § 600.9 evoked—charges that requiring state authorization would lead to
“inappropriate state involvement” in academic decision-making. 170 But, for many reasons, this
system would better serve the interests of academic freedom and of quality assurance.
Unlike regional accreditors, state officials are politically accountable. 171 While regional
accreditors can make costly demands on colleges and intervene in a university’s decision-making
with impunity, state officials are either elected or accountable to someone who is elected. The
level of direct accountability would depend, of course, upon the system that the state established.
State constitutions or statutes could create an entirely new elected office responsible for
authorizing all universities that operate within the state. The individual holding this position
would be directly accountable to the people and his interest in reelection would prevent him from
instituting requirements that impinge upon academic or religious freedom or that substantially
raise tuition costs. Although voters are often individually rationally ignorant, collectively they
have an incentive to monitor the actions elected officials for deviations from what the median
voter might want. 172 Higher education is an industry within states. Universities directly employ
citizens; most young people attend college after high school; 173 businesses benefit from the
influx of out of state students who become new customers; and state industries need members of
a skilled work force. Because any measures would directly affect so many citizens, voters, on
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the margin, will determine that the benefits of remaining informed on issues of higher education
outweigh its costs. Further, most of the costs of monitoring could be borne by private watchdog
groups who sound the alarm when an official does something improper such as PIRG—Public
Interest Research Group—currently does. In short, as Yandle might put it, voters demand for
higher quality and lower cost higher education could incentivize state officials to increase the
supply by developing outcome-based methods of assessing an institutions performance and by
encouraging low-cost and innovative new educational programs. Because they are not publicly
accountable—elected by traditional universities institutionally opposed to innovation—the
accreditors have no incentive to pursue such reforms.
Another force would prevent a state from instituting heavy-handed or unnecessarily
costly measures—that is, competition from other states in the markets both for students and for
universities. States have an incentive to attract out-of-state students and to persuade in-state
students to remain at home. At public universities, these out-of-state students pay substantially
higher tuition rates than in-state students do. As Scott Jaschik observes, “[T]he parents who
must pay those bills vote in other states, so these tuition dollars are much less politically costly
than those gained by raising in-state rates.” 174 Out-of-state students subsidize the tuition of state
residents. At the same time, states must compete with the other states for these students. This
competition should drive states to pursue measures that lower costs both for in-state and for outof-state students and that increase the quality of universities within the state so that students will
flock to them and, perhaps, decide to remain in the state after graduation, becoming permanent
members of the tax base. As members of the Western Governors Association recognized when
they considered opening the fully online, competency-based university now known as WGU,
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states have a strong incentive to keep costs low so that industries within each state will have the
skilled work forces needed to make that state’s economy grow. 175 Because the state currently
shares responsibility for quality assurance with unaccountable accreditors, the state has
abdicated much of its authority in this arena.
Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder have considered and promptly rejected the idea of a
centralized federal agency acting as an accreditor: “Rather than maintaining or encouraging
diversity, every institution would be pushed towards a common politically popular vision once a
set of universal standards were in place. In other words, an FDA for education ‘would represent
the ultimate in centralization, standardization and uniformity.’” 176 By contrast, a state-centered
approach to quality assurance would also allow the states to experiment with different methods
of measuring and of achieving student outcomes. As methods of measuring student success
improved, the market for higher education would function better because consumers would have
more information available to them on the academic quality of institutions. States could choose
to specialize in academic quality as Delaware has done in the area of corporate law. Such
specialization would not only benefit higher education in general, as other states might adopt
some of the quality measures the specialist state has developed, but it would also benefit the state
which would become known for its quality institutions and which might attract for-profit
distance universities looking for a mark of quality.
The market for universities—as states compete to attract new, innovative, and costeffective means to educate its citizens—would also lower barriers to entry for new, innovative
universities. If, for instance, one state imposed requirements on a new online university that
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were too onerous, that university could look to forty-nine other states for authorization. At the
same time, market forces and public accountability would prevent a state from becoming a haven
for diploma mills.
Critical to our hypothesis is that voters keep their states accountable—that they demand
reform and hold the state to its promises. If they do, the states could spearhead much needed
reform in higher education—reform that the accreditors have no incentive to pursue and that
states have little incentive to undertake as long as they can pass the blame on to someone else.

VI.

Conclusion
The higher education system in this country is broken and, for over half of a century, the

accreditation system presently in place has done little but exacerbate the problems. The key to
reform is voter education on what the accreditation system is and what it is not. As we have
shown throughout this paper, accreditation says little to nothing about the academic quality of an
institution. Further, the costs associated with obtaining this meaningless mark of approval have
contributed to making higher education unobtainable to some students and impractical for others.
Although we attempted to provide some suggestions for reform, our intent in this paper was not
to provide a “silver bullet” solution for a complicated problem. Instead, ultimately, it was to
show that the accreditors—bodies run by the institutions that they govern—do not have the
proper incentives to effect meaningful reform. Left to its own device, the state does not have an
incentive to effect these reforms either. But, educated and involved voters create the incentive to
for state officials to act—not in the public interest, but in a way that is a rational response to the
demands that voters place upon them.

